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Abstract- Providing a mechanism to authenticate users in healthcare applications is an essential security
requirement to prevent both external and internal attackers from penetrating patients’ identities and re-
vealing their health data. Many schemes have been developed to provide authentication mechanisms to
ensure that only legitimate users are authorized to connect, but these schemes still suffer from vulnerable
security. Various attacks expose patients’ data for malicious tampering or destruction. Transferring health-
related data and information between users and the health centre makes them exposed to penetration by
adversaries as they may move through an insecure channel. In addition, previous mechanisms have suffered
from the poor protection of users’ authentication information. To ensure the protection of patients’ infor-
mation and data, we propose a scheme that authenticates users based on the information of both the device
and the legitimate user. In this paper, we propose a Robust Authentication Model for Healthcare Users
(RAMHU) that provides mutual authentication between server and clients. This model utilizes an Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) and PHOTON to achieve strong security and a good overall
performance. RAMHU relies on multi pseudonyms, physical address, and one-time password mechanisms to
authenticate legitimate users. Moreover, extensive informal and formal security analysis with the automated
validation of Internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA) tool demonstrates that our model offers
a high level of security in repelling a wide variety of possible attacks.
Index terms— Anonymity, ECIES, MAC, mutual authentication, OTP, PHOTON, multi pseudonyms,
healthcare applications
1 Introduction
A lack of security and confidentiality of information and data used by healthcare (HC) applica-
tions remains the main problem that limits widespread of these applications. These systems require
∗Corresponding author: e-mail: Mishall.Al-Zubaidie@usq.edu.au).
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a robust security mechanism to authenticate HC users for achieving the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability (CIA) triangle [1, 2] and the compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPPA) and Health Level Seven (HL7) standards to protect data from being
tampered and altered [3]. Security requirements (CIA) should be implemented when exchanging
data between a client (patient or provider) application and a server application, as any modification
to this data affects both medical decisions and the patient’s condition [4]. Authentication is the first
as well as the most critical security requirement that plays a key role in building correct security
before the exchange of patients’ data in HC applications [4, 5, 6, 7]. On one hand, authentication
can reduce malicious or fatal errors caused by penetration attacks on the authentication information.
On the other hand, it alleviates errors in specifying drug, dose, timing, or procedure [8]. As a result,
authentication protocols are a critical requirement to repel various attacks. Typically, the server
application should prevent all fake and illegal authentication requests [9, 10]. It should protect
personal information, health records, and physiological parameters (such as sugar, and heart rate)
[4, 11]. However, authentication information may be easier to compromise if data and information
are stored on a single server. Furthermore, the transfer of authentication information in an insecure
environment (wireless local area network (WLAN) or Internet), may expose patients’ data for de-
tection or modification [6, 12]. Some of the recent cases of security threats on HC applications are
presented as follows:
• Penetration attacks on HC data in the United States’ hospitals have occurred (2013). These
attacks revealed 85.4% of the protected health information (PHI) of the 5 largest incidents for
patients’ records [13];
• Apple Health (Medicaid) was exposed to data breach (2016). This attack revealed 370,000
records of users (Washington state) [14];
• An unauthenticated user penetrated the electronic health record (EHR) containing 14,633
records in the New Jersey Diamond Institute for Fertility and Menopause (2017) [15].
The traditional cryptography (such as Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA)) and signature (such as
secure hash algorithm 1 (SHA-1)) schemes require complex computations that consume server re-
sources such as processing power and memory to deal with large amounts of health data in HC
applications [16] and thus, which could render them unusable. The electronic signature is used to
check the integrity of the users’ information in the authentication request [17]. Many lightweight
algorithms such as PHOTON, QUARK, and SPONGENT, are desired to implement electronic sig-
nature that perform lightweight operations to reduce high overheads on the server. HC applications
require cryptographic and signature high-speed, and secure algorithms [18]. To implement an au-
thentication scheme, many algorithms, such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), RSA, hash
function, bilinear pairing, fuzzy extractor, and XOR operation [19], are used in HC application
projects. Many recent HC applications are based on ECC and RSA, both of which provide the same
security level, although ECC is more efficient than RSA.The design of an authentication protocols in
HC applications should provide mutual authentication, resistance to known attacks such as man-in-
the-middle (MITM), eavesdropping, tracing, replay, impersonation, guessing, denial of service (DoS)
[20], protection of information and reduced cost and high-efficiency [21, 22].
1.1 Our Contributions
We propose a Robust Authentication Model for HC Users (RAMHU) for HC applications that
perform massive and continuous authentication processes while simultaneously protecting against
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various attacks. Our contributions include providing robust authentication for legitimate users in
the HC applications and access the server repository. They are summarized as follows:
• RAMHU uses lightweight algorithms for encryption (ECIES) and signature (PHOTON). These
algorithms provide efficient and secure authentication for users in HC applications compared
to other algorithms;
• RAMHU applies a one-time password (OTP) mechanism to authenticate users in their first
registration in the HC network with timestamp verification and random nonce generation to
repel different types of external attacks;
• RAMHU uses a multi pseudonyms mechanism to prevent any association between the real
information, pseudonyms, and user’s data. This mechanism prevents attackers from identifying
HC users (providers and patients);
• RAMHU integrates login request with media access control (MAC) address in addition to
verifying that this address is original and not fake for authentication of legitimate devices.
This prevents attackers from using different devices to compromise the network information;
• RAMHU improvements the mutual authentication between server and clients to prevent spoof-
ing and impersonation attacks by either fake server or client. This prevents external attacks
intended to deceive trusted parties;
• We simulate RAMHU with an automated validation of Internet security protocols and ap-
plications (AVISPA) tool that is generally acknowledged as an effective way to represent the
threat model. We have used AVISPA to prove that our model is secure against both passive
and active attacks.
1.2 Structure of the paper
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses previous studies related to our
research. Threat model and basic concepts about the techniques used in RAMHU will be introduced
in Section 3. Section 4 describes the proposed authentication model. Section 5 describes informal
and formal security analysis for our proposed scheme. The conclusion and future research directions
are presented in Section 6.
2 Related Work
There are many authentication schemes in literature related to our research area. This section
discusses in brief the suggestions in previous studies to design authentication schemes in order to
ensure the security of HC users in the network. We investigated these solutions and found that they
had different drawbacks. We will discuss the solutions and their disadvantages while clarifying the
superiority of our scheme on existing studies.
He and Zeadally [1] proposed an authentication scheme based on ECC and advanced encryp-
tion standards (AES) algorithms. Their scheme uses three entities: user, server, and controller.
The authors claimed that their scheme provides many requirements such as mutual authentication,
anonymity, and forward confidentiality. The problem with this scheme is that user and controller
identities are statically sent to all three entities. If the attacker can penetrate the encryption, he/she
can see the related user and controller identities. The attacker can then generate a random number,
temporary key, timestamp, and message authentication code. Subsequently, he/she can encrypt the
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user and controller identities and obtain the message authentication code and send it to the network
to become a legitimate and authenticated user. In addition, this scheme uses a 160-bit key with
ECC, which is considered unreliable by trusted institutions such as the national institute of stan-
dards and technology (NIST). Our scheme uses a 256-bit key and does not exchange real information
for legitimate users between clients and servers. An authentication protocol proposed to protect pa-
tients’ passwords by RSA against off-line password-guessing attacks [17]. The main problem in their
scheme is that the authors used RSA with the 1024 key. This algorithm affects the performance of a
huge HC network. Many schemes recommend using ECC [23, 24, 25], as the ECC-160 is equivalent
to RSA-1024 with the same security level. In addition, their protocol suffers from sending an ID
clearly from a client to the server at the registration phase, which causes authentication information
to be detected for analysis attacks. Using shared-key to implement authentication mechanism is de-
signed to prevent known attacks, especially DoS attacks [6]. The authors used the wrong password
detection mechanism to reduce the risk of DoS attacks. However, the registration phase of their
scheme is not reliable if the ID of patients is sent through an unsafe channel. Additionally, their
research suffers from scalability because of the use of the single secret-key mechanism that needs
protection from all parties.
Farash et al. [26] proposed an authentication scheme based on ECC for HC environments. They
pointed out that their scheme provides forward secrecy. Their scheme provides authentication dur-
ing the exchange of messages between the server and RFID (radio-frequency identification)’s tag.
However, their scheme shows that the information (identities) and data are stored on a single server,
and if the server is hacked, the users’ information and data are exposed to detection, tempering, and
modification. The ECC and a Petri Nets model are proposed to achieve an authentication require-
ment to protect HC applications through the mobile cloud [27]. The authors pointed out that their
scheme is resistant to attacks of eavesdropping, tracking, replay, and spoofing. Unfortunately, their
scheme does not address the issue of steal/loss of tag or device and internal attacks that are more
serious than external attacks in accessing patients’ data as well as no indication of what signature
algorithm is used to integrity. In addition, tag’s ID is explicitly sent from server to tag, which makes
it easier for the attacker to parse the authentication request. Jiang et al. [28] designed a three-factor
(biometric, smart card and password) authentication protocol to protect e-health clouds. Their
scheme protects authentication requests from impersonation attacks and off-line password guessing
if a mobile device is lost or stolen. Their scheme relies on ECC to support the confidentiality and
authentication of HC’s users. They used a fuzzy extractor to keep a biometric secret. However,
this scheme relies on a single server to authenticate users, which is the target of the attackers. In
addition, it performs 7 hash operations that can exhaust the single server capabilities if the network
has a huge number of HC users, especially if it is not a lightweight hash. Our model has supe-
rior capacity, as it uses separation server (attribute server) for users’ information and also only 5
lightweight hash operations in the central server.
Cloud-assisted conditional privacy preserving authentication (CACPPA) [7] proposed to authen-
ticate the network’s nodes. This scheme used ECIES and elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) algorithms with a timestamp and pseudonym integration to perform the authentication
process. The problem with this scheme is that it does not provide mutual authentication to prevent
an attack from a counterfeit party. Furthermore, authors did not explain the size of the keys in the
algorithms to make sure that their scheme was able to repel the various attacks. Furthermore, a
single pseudonym cannot separate the link to the real information to prevent analysing and track-
ing attacks for authentication requests. Das et al. [5] provided a user authentication scheme for
HC applications based on AES and hash (SHA-1). They used biometrics users and the anonymity
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feature to repel attacks such as replay, MITM, and privileged insider. However, their scheme will
suffer from key management problem if applied to a large health institution with hundreds of users
including managing users’ accounts from adding and deleting, as symmetric encryption suffers from
a scalability problem, as well as the difficulty of managing the single secret key. Furthermore, the
attacker can submit a forgery attack on the login message if it detects the single secret key. Recently,
Chandrakar and Om [19] provided an authentication scheme based on ECC and hash. Their scheme
has supported several servers in user authentication with three factors. In this case, the user can
connect to any server to perform the authentication process. In this scheme, the authors did not
specify which hash algorithm was used and the size of the message digest (MD), which is necessary
for repelling attacks such as collision and preimage. Using multiple servers means that the same
users’ information is stored on more than one server; thus, the penetration of any server that causes
users’ information to be detected or modified. Additionally, this scheme did not use a mechanism
to prevent the association of real user information with authentication requests such as pseudonyms.
3 The Basic Techniques for our Authentication Scheme
Authentication mechanism specify connecting users to network services securely. The HC system
needs a set of techniques to implement the authentication mechanism before accessing patients’
records. One authentication technique will not be sufficient to repel known attacks. To ensure that
only legitimate users are associated with the HC application network, our project includes a set
of techniques to validate the authentication request. In our scheme, we relied on algorithms that
provide lightweight operations and a high-security level for encryption and signature operations.
This section describes the threat model and the basic concepts of these techniques.
3.1 Threat Model
The threat model has used to detect security weakness in authentication schemes. The threat
model is applied to RAMHU based on the Dolev-Yao (dy) [29] model in order to build a valid
authentication process in insecure environments such as WLAN or Internet. The dy model is an
efficient and practical way to illustrate security protocols in the real world. In addition, it is a formal
examplar for modelling the risk of attackers against authentication protocols. This model is useful in
detecting internal, external, single, and multiple attacks [30]. In our threat model, we assume that
an intruder is capable of carrying out an internal, external, passive, or active attack such as MITM,
replay, eavesdropping, and spoofing. Also, we assume that attributes server (AS) is trustworthy. It
is safe against repository penetration attacks. We assume threats in our model as follows:
• The attacker can steal the client application and its files to analyse the data, retrieve the
parameters, and reveal the secret key, and then use these applications on different devices.
• The attacker can listen for authentication requests in the insecure environment and execute
interception, replay and MITM attacks in order to become a legitimate user in the network.
• The attacker can execute a forgery or masquerading attack in an attempt to penetrate the
authentication process.
• A legitimate user can perform a privileged insider attack based on his/her legitimacy in the
network.
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The first layer
cryptographic
protocol
The second layer
elliptic curve
point mul-
tiplication
The third layer
point operations
The lower finite
field arithmetic
ECC (ECIES,
ECDSA
and ECDH)
Point multipli-
cation (PM)
Point additioin Point doubling
Multiplication Addition Squaring Inversion
Figure 1: Arithmetic operations in ECC hierarchy
Table 1: keys sizes and some information for asymmetric algorithms
Algo. Keys sizes Ratio Author(s) Year
Mathmatical
problem
RSA
Rivest,
Shamirand,
and Adleman
1978
Integer
factorization
Elgamal
1024 2048 3072 7680 15360
Taher Elgamal 1985
Multiplicative
group
ECIES 160-223 224-255 256-383 384-511 512-more
1:6-30 Neal Koblitz,
and
Victor Miller
1985
Elliptic curve
discrete log.
(ECDLP)
• The attacker can successfully guess the real username, password, role and pseudonym associ-
ated with it during intensive analysis of many authentication requests.
3.2 Overview of Techniques
• Elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES)
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has been used to provide security requirements. It pro-
vides confidentiality, integrity, and authentication in the communications network with limited
capacity in terms of power and processing. This algorithm was independently proposed by Neal
Koblitz and Victor Miller in 1985 [31]. It depends on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP),
which is impervious to known attacks when selecting parameters accurately [32], i.e., difficulty
obtaining k from P and Q (where k is integer, and P and Q are two points on the curve). Small
parameters used in ECC help to perform computations quickly. These computations are im-
portant in constrained-source and large environments that require processing power, memory,
or power consumption [20, 33]. ECC provides encryption (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryp-
tion Scheme(ECIES)), signature (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)), and
exchange keys (Elliptic Cuvre Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)) approaches [31]. Many operations are
performed in ECC algorithms (described in four layers) as shown in Figure 1 [34]. ECIES
has provided confidentiality and proven to be extremely efficient in its performance, as it uses
small keys; thus, the cost of computation is small compared with other public key cryptog-
raphy algorithms, such as Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) [35]. Table 1 [33, 36, 37] shows a
comparison of key sizes for public key encryption algorithms.
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Table 2: Comparison of lightweight hash function algorithms
Performace Security
Algorithm Gate equivalent
area
Throughput
(kbps)
MD
PR SPR CR
Author (s) Year
SQUASH 2646 GE 0.15 64 64 64 0 Shamir 2005
MAME 8100 GE 146.7 256 - - - Yoshida et al. 2007
C-PRESENT-192 8048 GE 59.26 192 192 192 96 Bogdanov et al. 2008
ARMADILLO2 8653 GE 9.38 256 256 256 128 Bald et al. 2010
S-QUARK 2296 GE 3.13 256 224 112 112 Aumasson et al. 2010
KECCAK-f[400] 5090 GE 14.4 128 128 128 64 Kavun and Yalcin 2010
GLUON 4724 GE 32 224 224 112 112 Berger et al. 2011
SPONGENT-256 3281 GE 11.43 256 240 128 128 Bogdanov et al. 2011
PHOTON-256 2177 GE 0.88 256 224 128 128 Guo et al. 2011
• Lightweight hash-function algorithm
Hash function has used to generate signatures for authentication requests. PHOTON is
lightweight hash-function and extremely suitable for projects that require a robust and re-
liable signature. This algorithm is based on a sponge-like construction and AES-like primitive
for domain extension and permutation efficiency [38, 39, 40]. PHOTON is available in several
versions (80, 128, 160, 224, and 256). It is a balance between the efficiency in the execution
of computations on the one hand and security in the implementation of the features of the
signature principle that depend on preimage resistant (PR), second preimage resistant (SPR),
collision resistant (CR) and mixing-transformation [17] on the other hand. It uses sponge
construction and applies two phases of absorbing and squeezing to produce message digest
(MD); more details are available in [41]. Table 2 provides a comparison among the lightweight
hash algorithms (the latest version of these algorithms) in terms of security and efficiency
[39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46]. Although standard hash algorithms are still used in applications
such as SHA-1 (5527 GE, MD 160-bit) and SHA-2 (10868 GE, MD 256-bit), lightweight hash
algorithms such as PHOTON (2177 GE, MD 256-bit) provides the most effective solution for
handling complex signatures in large HC systems.
Table 2 shows that the PHOTON-256 (2177 GE) provides the best performance compared
to all lightweight hash functions and offers a high level of security through the application of
signature features PR (224), SPR (128), and CR (128). Linear and differential attacks are
the most powerful attacks in the MD analysis of hash functions. Compared to PHOTON,
ARMADILLO and SPONGENT-256 also offer signature features, but both are vulnerable to
attacks, where ARMIDLLO2 has been attacked by local linearization (practical semi-free-start
collision attack)[47] and SPONGENT has been attacked by linear distinguishers (23 rounds)
[48] and (13 rounds) [49] for all SPONGENT versions; and additionally, they need the most
computations (3281 GE and 8653 GE) compared PHOTON-256 (2177 GE). PHOTON is a
reliable algorithm against linear and differential attacks [41]. It has a high level of security
and efficiency; therefore, it is suitable for our project as a signature mechanism.
• One time password (OTP)
OTP is a way to authenticate legitimate users by generating passcode or nonce only once
in a specified time. It will not be applicable the next times for authentication. OTP is an
effective method for authenticating users in HC applications if used with robust encryption
and signature technologies. Using a static password, or nonce without other authentication
mechanisms is weak in respect to attacks. Therefore, OTP provides significant support to the
authentication process. This mechanism prevents many attacks such as replay, MITM, and
guessing [50]. The attacker cannot use this passcode or nonce to connect to the network later.
The client sends OTP as part of an authentication request. If the authentication process is
valid, the server will delete OTP from the dataset and will not accept it in the future. OTP
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is a powerful mechanism to mitigate the risk of hackers’ communication in the network. In
this project, we apply OTP to generate a random password with the first link to users in HC
applications to ensure that only legitimate users are connected to the network.
• Mutual authentication
Mutual authentication is a prerequisite for preventing fraudulent authentication requests. The
traditional methods of authentication (such as password and name) are not suitable for HC
applications [18]. In general, there are two kinds of authentication, simple and mutual. In
simple authentication, one party performs the authentication process, for example, the server
verifies the authentication request for the client. This type of authentication is vulnerable to
attacks such as spoofing and impersonation. The attacker can use his device as a fake server
to receive all clients’ requests. Mutual authentication provides a security solution to prevent
known attacks [18]. In this type of authentication, each party authenticates the other party
and thus, prevents counterfeit attacks by both client or server. In RAMHU, we adopt the
mechanism of mutual authentication in the preservation of users’ information and data.
• Media access control (MAC) address
MAC address has used to distinguish legitimate users’ devices in a network during the com-
pletion of the authentication process. All network devices of different types should contain
a hardware card (interface) to connect to the local or global network. Each wire or wireless
interface has a media access control (MAC) or physical address that consists of a 48-bit. It is
divided into six octets and written in hexadecimal such as ”8C: 70: 5A: 41: 49: BC”. This
address is a unique identifier (no duplicate address twice) for a device defined as a global and
persistent [51]. This address is used in WLAN networks because it offers advantages such as
reducing costs and speed in access control procedures [52]. It can be changed programmati-
cally in various operating systems such as Linux and Windows. In addition, anyone can use
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) to detect the MAC address of another user in the network
[53]. The main problem with this address is that the attacker can execute an eavesdropping
attack to access the MAC addresses of legitimate devices in the network and then select a
legitimate MAC address to use it. For instance, an attacker could execute an ARP poisoning
or spoofing attack by using a fake identifier of the MAC address (for a legitimate entity) to
gain illegal privileges that would enable it to perform other attacks such as MITM and DOS
[54]. In addition, randomization operations for the MAC address have become useless in the
protection against tracking attacks [55, 56]. Therefore, if the server does not have a mechanism
to detect MAC address change, the attacker becomes a legitimate user in the network and has
access to network resources.
4 The Proposed Authentication Scheme
In this section, we will detail about RAMHU that provides security and efficiency features in HC
applications. This section will be divided into the network model, security goals, and proposed
authentication protocols. Notations listed in Table 3 are used to describe symbols used throughout
this paper.
4.1 Network Model
The RAMHU model consists of four entities, as shown in Figure 2:
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Table 3: Paper’s notations
Symbol Description
Ci Client entity or user
CS Central server
AS Attributes server
DS Data server
UIDi, MIDi Ci’s identity and medical centre identity
PWi, tmpPWi Ci’s password, temporary password
CiKpui , CiKpri Ci public and private key
CSKpui , CSKpri CS public and private key
ASKpui , ASKpri AS public and private key
TSCi , TSCS , TSAS Timestamp generated by Ci, CS, AS
NCi , NCS , NAS Nonce random generated by Ci, CS, AS
I Internal, or external intruder
II, EI Internal intruder and external intruder
h(.) One-way hash function
Ri Role of patient, patient relative or provider
RRi Revocation reason
OTPi One time password to authenticate first time
CiSigj Signature generated by Ci and j is signature number
CSSigj Signature generated by CS
ASSigj Signature generated by AS
UPCSCi
, PMCSCi
User and medical centre pseudonyms sent by Ci and verified by CS
UPASCS , PM
AS
CS User and medical centre pseudonyms sent by CS and verified by AS
UPCSAS , PM
CS
AS User and medical centre pseudonyms sent by AS and verified by CS
UP
Ci
CS , PM
Ci
CS User and medical centre pseudonyms sent by CS and verified by Ci‖, ⊕ Concatenation and exclusive or operations
GM, CM Get MAC and check MAC address
Enci, Deci Encryption and decryption operations
1. Client (Ci): This entity includes patients, relatives of patients, and HC providers such as
doctors, researchers, emergency practitioners, advisors, and nurses.
2. Central server (CS): This entity is a gateway to authenticate users with the attributes server
and to authorize the data server.
3. Attributes server (AS): This entity contains users’ real information as well as multi pseudonyms.
The authentication process requires verifying the association of the actual information with
the multi pseudonyms in this entity.
4. Data server (DS): This entity contains users’ data as well as multi pseudonyms. This entity
is not implemented in our scheme and is left to future work. Our scheme focuses only on the
process of users’ authentication in the HC network.
Generally, Ci creates an authentication request mainly based on ECIES and PHOTON. Ci sends
a request to CS to verify encryption, signature, and security parameters (such as MAC address,
pseudonyms, and OTPi). Then, the CS sends a request to the AS to verify the link between the
pseudonyms, the real information, the signatures, and PWi. After that, the AS sends the response
to the CS that verifies the signature and the parameters and then the CS sends the response
(authenticated or not) to the Ci. If the user is authenticated, we assume that the user can then send
an authorization request to access the data in the repository (DS) and obtain the authorization
response from the CS, AS, and DS.
4.2 Security Goals
To build a robust authentication scheme, RAMHU adopts the following security requirements:
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Figure 2: General network model
• Confidentiality: This requirement is performed to hide authentication information and to
preserve user secrecy from detection by intruders. To implement this requirement, a high-
security cryptographic algorithm [20] should be used. RAMHU executes ECIES to hide au-
thentication information about intruders.
• Integrity: This is to protect the authentication request information from modification by
intruders. The authentication request should reach the intended destination without modi-
fication to provide a reliable communication channel for legitimate users [57, 10]. RAMHU
performs a PHOTON to prevent any process of modifying the user authentication information
in HC applications.
• Non-repudiation: This requirement prevents both clients and server from denying their
authentication requests. This is a way to prove that the message is sent by a particular sender
in the HC applications network. If a legitimate user in the network performs internal attacks,
he/she cannot deny his/her activities while exploiting the privileges granted to him/her. Our
scheme uses PHOTON signatures and a MAC address to meet this requirement and detect
malicious attacks.
• Anonymity: This requirement is extremely important in supporting the confidentiality of
the authentication request. The purpose of this requirement is to disguise the source and
destination of the authentication request. If the authentication scheme applies anonymity
with encryption, the attacker finds it exceedingly difficult to analyze authentication requests
for a particular user at different times because the authentication request is different each time
the user is connected to the network [7]. RAMHU applies this requirement through the use of
random nonces between entities.
• Pseudonym: This requirement denotes the provision of a mechanism to connect non-real at-
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tributes (such as terms and symbols) with the real attributes of the user (such as name, address,
and phone number). The use of this mechanism in HC applications is an extremely important
way to protect the personal information of users and prevent the detection of their identities.
RAMHU uses a multi pseudonyms mechanism to prevent and separate the association with
real information.
• Forward secrecy: This requirement is accomplished when network users use new keys and
parameters temporarily without relying on old ones. This requirement prevents attackers
from exploiting users’ keys and passwords in decrypting authentication requests. Using the
temporary random password, private key, and MAC, RAMHU prevents users from accessing
previous authentication information.
• Mutual authentication: This requirement is used in HC applications to mitigate the risks
of external fraud. With this feature, each party ensures that it deals with a legitimate party.
The server authenticates the client by checking encryptions and signatures and vice versa in
order to establish a secure communication channel. In RAMHU, CS and Ci authenticate each
other to prevent masquerading and impersonating attacks.
• Scalability: HC applications operate in a scalable environment in terms of data and users.
Therefore, these applications require authentication schemes capable of handling and adapting
to the ever-increasing number of users of HC applications. This requirement refers to the
ability of the authentication scheme to appropriately handle large HC systems. Public key
encryption schemes are efficient in supporting this requirement [27].
• Freshness: This requirement indicates that the authentication request is new and updated
to ensure that the attacker cannot replay the authentication request at a later time. This
requirement is achieved through the provision of time checking, a random nonce, and change
of signatures in each authentication process to counteract counterfeit attacks such as MITM,
replay, and impersonation [20], which ensures that the authentication request is unaltered or
not tampered with.
4.3 Proposed Authentication Scheme
RAMHU scheme consists of 5 protocols: initial setup, registration/login, authentication, password
update, and revocation. During these protocols, RAMHU provides reliable authentication processes
to protect users’ information.
4.3.1 Initial Setup Protocol
In this protocol, all entities are ready to start communicating with each other while configuring all
security parameters and ECIES’s keys as in the following steps:
• Each legitimate user receives a client application from the authorized system provider.
• Each legitimate user receives a PWi (that can be changed later) and a random OTPi to be
used in the first registration.
• All entities (Ci, CS and AS) should create public and private keys (Ci (CKpui , CKpri), CS
(CSKpui , CSKpri), and AS (ASKpui , ASKpri)) to be used to validate the authentication
request. All entities choose an elliptic curve Ep(a, b) over a prime field FP (where, P = 256)
and base point G on curve. Each entity selects a private key Kpri randomly and generates the
public key Kpui during the implementation of scalar multiplication (Kpui = Kpri ∗G).
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Registration and login protocol:
Inputs UIDi, MIDi, PWi, and OTPi
Replaces UIDi with UP
CS
Ci
and
MIDi with MP
CS
Ci
Generates TSCi
Calls GM and CM
Generates NCi
CiSig1 = h(CM ||NCi ||TSCi )
CiSig2 = h(GM ||NCi ||TSCi ||CiSig1||
UPCSCi
||MPCSCi ||OTPi||PWi)
Computes tmpPWi = PWi ⊕NCi⊕
GM ⊕ CiSig1
Requesti = Enci(TSCi ||NCi ||GM ||CiSig1||
UPCSCi
||MPCSCi ||OTPi||tmpPWi
||CiSig2)
tmpCiKpri = CiKpri ⊕ PWi ⊕ CiSig2
Registration and login request
From Ci: Registration & login request
Deci(Requesti)
Checks TSCS − TCi ≤ 4T
Checks OTPi in dataset
If yes delete OTPi from dataset
CSSig1 = h(”Real MAC”||NCi ||TSCi )
Checks CSSig1 = CiSig1
Saves GM in dataset
Checks UPCSCi
and MPCSCi
in datasets
Computes PWi = tmpPWi ⊕NCi ⊕GM
⊕CSSig1
CSSig2 = h(GM ||NCi ||TSCi ||CSSig1||
UPCSCi
||MPCSCi ||OTPi||PWi)
Checks CSSig2 = CiSig2
Figure 3: Registration and login protocol
• All entities broadcast the public key (CKpui , CSKpui , and ASKpui) to use in ECIES’s en-
cryption operations.
4.3.2 Registration and Login Protocol
Patients and HC providers (Ci) should complete the registration and login protocol with CS to
become legitimate users of HC applications. Without this protocol, the user cannot complete the
authentication process in RAMHU. User registration is performed once, namely, the user does not
need to complete the registration protocol the next times (only the login protocol), the registration
information has been kept in the servers until the revocation protocol and deletion the user security
parameters such as pseudonyms, MAC address and PWi, this protocol accomplishes the following
steps (Figure 3 shows registration, and login protocol and Figure 4 shows login protocol):
Ci side:
• The user enters UIDi (such as his/her name), MIDi (such as medical centre name), PWi
and OTPi for registration and login while only entering UIDi, MIDi, and PWi for the login
protocol the next times to the client (Ci) application. Ci replaces UIDi with user’s pseudonym
(UPCSCi ), and MIDi with medical centre pseudonym (MP
CS
Ci
) to protect the authentication
information when moving from Ci to CS. Ci generates timestamp (TSCi) to be used to verify
the sending time of the registration/login request in CS.
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Login protocol:
Inputs UIDi, MIDi and PWi
Replaces UIDi with UP
CS
Ci
and
MIDi with MP
CS
Ci
Generates TSCi
Calls GM and CM
CiKpri = tmpCiKpri ⊕GM ⊕ PWi ⊕NCi
Generates NCi
CiSig1 = h(CM ||NCi ||TSCi )
CiSig2 = h(GM ||NCi ||TSCi ||CiSig1||
UPCSCi
||MPCSCi ||PWi)
Computes tmpPWi = PWi ⊕NCi⊕
GM ⊕ CiSig1
Requesti = Enci(TSCi ||NCi ||CiSig1||UPCSCi
||MPCSCi ||tmpPWi||CiSig2)
tmpCiKpri = CiKpri ⊕ PWi ⊕ CiSig2
Login request
From Ci: (login request)
Deci(Requesti)
Checks TSCS − TCi ≤ 4T
Checks UPCSCi
and MPCSCi
in datasets
Retrieves GM from dataset
CSSig1 = h(”Real MAC”||NCi ||TSCi )
Checks CSSig1 = CiSig1
Computes PWi = tmpPWi ⊕NCi ⊕GM
⊕CSSig1
CSSig2 = h(GM ||NCi ||TSCi ||CSSig1||
UPCSCi
||MPCSCi ||PWi)
Checks CSSig2 = CiSig2
Figure 4: Login protocol
• Ci gets a MAC address (GM) by entering its IP (Internet protocol) address. The process
of checking MAC (CM) is performed by Ci to test the credibility of the MAC address.
In the Linux system, we used the command ”ethtool -P interface name” (such as ”eth-
tool -P wlo1”) in the Ci application. If the result is identical to GM , it means that the
MAC address is native (CM = ”Real MAC”). In Windows system, Ci searches for string
value ”NetworkAddress” in the path of the system registry (”HKEY LOCAL MACHINE \
SY STEM \ CurrentControlSet \ Control \ Class \ {4D36E972− E325− 11CE − BFC1−
08002BE10318}\”). If NetworkAddress = null, CM = ”Real MAC”; otherwise CM =
”Fake MAC”. The GM send is encrypted with an registration/login request while CM
is implicitly sent with the signature value (CiSig1). If only login protocol, Ci needs to ex-
tract private key from temporary key, MAC address, password, and random nonce through
tmpCiKpri ⊕GM ⊕PWi⊕NCi . Ci generates a random nonce (NCi) to change signature and
encryption data and add anonymity to the registration/login request.
• Ci performs two signatures using the PHOTON-256 algorithm to protect information from
modification. The first signature includes the parameters check MAC, nonce, and timestamp
(CiSig1 = h(CM‖NCi‖TSCi). The second signature includes all the authentication parame-
ters of the get MAC, nonce, timestamp, first signature, pseudonyms, one time password, and
password (CiSig2 = h(GM‖NCi‖TSCi‖ CiSig1‖UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖OTP‖PWi). In the login
protocol, OTP is not added to the signature.
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• Ci computes a temporary value (tmpPWi = PWi⊕NCi⊕GM⊕CiSig1) of PWi when moving
from Ci to CS.
• Ci uses ECIES to encrypt and hide all the data of this request (Enci(TSCi‖NCi‖GM‖CiSig1‖
UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖OTPi‖tmpPWi‖CiSig2)). In the login protocol, OTPi and GM are not added
to the encryption as in Figure 4. After that, Ci sends the registration and login request
or login to CS to complete the authentication protocol. Then Ci hides the private key by
tmpCiKpri = CiKpri ⊕ PWi ⊕ CiSig2 .
CS side:
• Upon receiving a registration and login request or login request, CS decrypts this request
using ECIES’s CiKpui and CSKpri . It checks timestamp (TSCS-TSCi ≤ 4T ) to make sure
that this request arrived at an appropriate time and without delay.
• In the registration and login protocol, CS examines the random OTPi in the dataset. If OTPi
exists, then the user is legitimate for the registration process. After that, CS deletes OTPi
from the dataset to prevent it from being used the next times. If OTPi is not found, It discards
the connection. If the login protocol, CS examines the UPCSCi and MP
CS
Ci
and then tests their
association with the MAC address in the dataset. If GM is found, CS completes the steps of
this protocol; otherwise, it cancels the connection.
• CS needs to ensure that the user’s device is legitimate within the network. CS computes the
signature value to make sure that the MAC address is native and non-modified (CSSig1 =
h(”Real MAC”‖NCi ‖TSCi). It examines the result of the computed signature (CSSig1) with
the Ci’s signature (CiSig1). If the signatures result are identical, then the device is legitimate
and the MAC address did not change. In the registration and login protocol, CS stores this
address in dataset for use and check the next times in the login protocol.
• CS performs the computation operation the tmpPWi ⊕NCi ⊕ GM ⊕ CSSig1 to extract the
PWi value and then uses this value to produce a second signature (CSSig2).
• CS computes a second signature operation (CSSig2= h(GM‖NCi‖TSCi‖CSSig1 ‖UPCSCi
‖MPCSCi ‖OTPi‖PWi) to guarantee that all the encrypted information is not changed. Then,
it compares the computed signature (CSSig2) with the received signature in the request
(CiSig2). If the signatures are identical, then the information for this request is unchanged or
not tampered. In the login protocol, OTPi and GM are not added to the signature. At this
point, CS prepares to send the user’s authentication request to AS.
4.3.3 Authentication Protocol
The authentication protocol verifies the reliability of the users’ security parameters with their per-
sonal information in the server. In this protocol, RAMHU needs to link pseudonyms and passwords
with real information for users in AS’s datasets. Note that, the users’ information (such as name, age,
address, mobile number, and passwords) are stored in a separate server (AS) and multi pseudonyms
used to prevent detection and tracking of users’ information. This protocol is illustrated in the
following steps (Figure 5 shows authentication protocol in RAMHU):
CS side:
• CS computes a new timestamp (TSCS) to ensure the fresh authentication request.
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To AS:
Computes TSCS =new TSCS
Replaces UPCSCi
with UPASCS and
MPCSCi
with MPASCS
Generates NCS
CSSig3 = h(TSCS ||NCS ||UPASCS ||MPASCS )
Computes tmpPWi = PWi ⊕NCS ⊕ CSSig3
Requesti = Enci(TSCS ||NCS ||UPASCS ||MPASCS
||CSSig3||tmpPWi)
Authentication request
From CS:
Deci(Requesti)
Checks TSAS − TCS ≤ 4T
Checks UPASCS and MP
AS
CS in datasets
and linked with real IDs
Computes PWi = tmpPWi ⊕NCS
⊕CSSig3
Checks PWi in dataset
ASSig1 = h(TSCS ||NCS ||UPASCS ||MPASCS )
Checks ASSig1 = CSSig3
To CS:
Computes TSAS = new TSAS
Replaces UPASCS with UP
CS
AS and
MPASCS with MP
CS
AS
Generates NAS
ASSig2 = h(TSAS ||NAS ||UPCSAS ||MPCSAS )
Responsei = Enci(TSAS ||NAS ||UPCSAS ||
MPCSAS ||ASSig2)
Authentication response
From AS:
Deci(Responsei)
Checks TSCS − TAS ≤ 4T
Checks UPCSAS and MP
CS
AS in datasets
CSSig4 = h(TSAS ||NAS ||UPCSAS ||MPCSAS )
Checks CSSig4 = ASSig2
To Ci:
Computes TSCS =new TSCS
Replaces UPCSAS with UP
Ci
CS and
MPCSAS with MP
Ci
CS
Generates NCS
CSSig5 = h(TSCS ||NCS ||UPCiCS ||MP
Ci
CS)
Responsei = Enci(TSCS ||NCS ||UPCiCS ||MP
Ci
CS
||CSSig5)
Login response
From CS:
CiKpri = tmpCiKpri ⊕ PWi
⊕CiSig2
Deci(Responsei)
Checks TSCi − TCS ≤ 4T
Checks UP
Ci
CS linked with UP
CS
Ci
and MP
Ci
CS linked with MP
CS
Ci
CiSig3 = h(TSCS ||NCS ||UPCiCS
||MPCiCS)
Checks CiSig3 = CSSig5
Generate NCi
tmpCiKpri = CiKpri ⊕GM⊕
PWi ⊕NCi
Mutual authentication
Figure 5: Authentication protocol
• CS replaces Ci’s pseudonyms (UPCSCi and MPCSCi ) with CS’s pseudonyms (UPASCS and MPASCS )
to prevent attackers from tracking the authentication request. It generates random nonce
(NCS) to ensure an anonymous authentication request.
• CS signs security parameters by PHOTON-256 (CSSig3 = h(TSCS‖NCS‖UPASCS ‖MPASCS ) to
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prevent modification of authentication request information.
• CS computes temporary PWi by the computation of PWi ⊕NCS ⊕ CSSig3.
• CS encrypts information of authentication request (Enci(TSCS‖NCS‖UPASCS ‖MPASCS ‖CSSig3
‖tmpPWi)). It sends an authentication request to verify user’s information in AS.
AS side:
• Upon receiving the authentication request, AS decrypts that request using ECIES’s ASKpri
and CSKpui to obtain the authentication information clearly.
• It checks timestamp by (TSAS − TSCS ≤ 4T ) to ensure that the authentication request is
not delayed. AS checks the pseudonyms (UPASCS and MP
AS
CS ) sent from CS and correlates it
with the user’s real identifier (UIDi and MIDi) in the datasets. AS extracts user’s password
from the equation PWi = tmpPWi ⊕ NCS ⊕ CSSig3. After that, It checks matching PWi
in the dataset. AS computes the value of the signature based on authentication information
(ASSig1 = h(TSCS‖NCS‖UPASCS ‖MPASCS )) by PHOTON-256. AS compares the computed
value of the signature (ASSig1) with the value of the received signature (CSSig3). If the sig-
nature values are identical, the user’s information in the request for the signature is unmodified.
At this point, AS considers this user to be legitimate and reliable.
• AS prepares a response to authenticate the request of that user. It computes new timestamp
(TSAS = new TSAS) to prevent delayed or replayed requests at later times. AS replaces CS’s
pseudonyms (UPASCS and UP
AS
CS ) received with AS’s pseudonyms (UP
CS
AS and MP
CS
AS ) to hide
users’ information. It generates a new random nonce (NAS) to add anonymity and prevent
attacks from encryption and signature analysis.
• AS computes a signature (ASSig2 = h(TSAS‖NAS‖UPCSAS ‖MPCSAS )) to prevent modifications
of authentication response information.
• AS encrypts the authentication information (Enci(TSAS‖NAS‖UPCSAS ‖MPCSAS ‖ ASSig2)) and
sends the authentication response to CS to complete the authentication process.
CS side:
• CS decrypts the authentication response (Enci) received from AS. It checks the timestamp
value (TSCS−TSAS ≤ 4T ) to prevent late authentication responses. It examines that UPASCS
and MPASCS in datasets to complete the process of linking multi pseudonyms to the user.
• CS computes the signature CSSig4 = h(TSAS‖NAS‖UPCSAS ‖MPCSAS ) for authentication re-
sponse information. It compares the computed result of the signature (CSSig4) with the
value of the received signature (ASSig2). If the signature values match, then the authentica-
tion response information is unchanged.
• After this point, CS initiates a login response request. It computes the value of new times-
tamp (TSCS = newTSCS). It replaces AS’s pseudonyms (UP
CS
AS and MP
CS
AS ) received with
UPCiCS and MP
Ci
CS . It generates a new random nonce (NCS) to hide encryption and signature
information.
• CS computes a new signature value (CSSig5 = h(TSCS‖NCS‖UPCiCS‖MPCiCS)) to protect login
response information from modification.
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• CS encrypts login response information (Enci(TSCS‖NCS‖UPCiCS‖MPCiCS‖CSSig5)) and sends
this response to Ci.
Ci side:
• Ci extracts his private key (CiKpri) from the tmpCiKpri ⊕ PWi ⊕ CiSig2, and decrypts the
login request (Enci) received from CS.
• Ci checks timestamp (TSCi − TSCS ≤ 4T ) to ensure that the login response is not late or
replayed.
• Ci checks that CS’s pseudonyms (UPCiCS and MPCiCS) are received in the dataset and associated
with UPCSCi and MP
CS
Ci
. At this point, RAMHU applied multi pseudonyms among model
entities (Ci, CS, and AS) to prevent traceability in linking the real information of the user
with pseudonyms.
• Ci calculates the value of the signature CiSig3 = h(TSCS‖NCS‖UPCiCS‖MPCiCS) for login re-
sponse information. It compares the result of the computed signature (CiSig3) and the value
of the received signature (CSSig5). If the signature values are identical, namely, the login
response information is unmodified or not tampered, Ci accepts the login response; otherwise
Ci discards the login response. Then, Ci hides its private key by CiKpri ⊕GM ⊕ PWi ⊕NCi
after generating a random nonce to prevent the detection of the private key if the device is
hacked. At this point, if all processes are achieved correctly, then all requests are considered
legitimate and reliable through the implementation of mutual authentication.
4.3.4 Password Update Protocol
Updating the password is a security procedure to ensure authentication of legitimate users. The
process of changing PWi is important in any HC system for two reasons. First, preventing the
use of PWi fixed for a long time and which reduces the guessing attacks. Second, changing PWi
gives users more flexibility in choosing the appropriate PWi. This process requires strict security
measures to protect new PWi. RAMHU provides the legitimate user with a mechanism to change
his/her password at any time. If the user wants to change his/her PWi, the following illustration
describes the new PWi protect procedures in a secure manner (Figure 6 shows password update
protocol in RAMHU).
• Ci side: Ci enters UIDi, MIDi, old PWi, and new PWi. It replaces UIDi and MIDi
with a pseudonyms to hide the user’s real information. Ci calls MAC address, then extracts
the private key from the tmpCiKpri ⊕ GM ⊕ oldPWi ⊕ NCi to use in the encryption pro-
cess of the password update request. Ci generates three random nonces (NC1 , NC2 , and
NC3) and computes a new timestamp (TSCi). Ci computes the signature value (CiSig1 =
h(TSCi‖NC1‖UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖oldPWi) by PHOTON-256 based on the parameters of the pass-
word change request. It applies an anonymity mechanism to old PWi and new PWi (tmp oldPWi
= oldPWi ⊕ NC2 ⊕ CiSig1 and tmp newPWi = newPWi ⊕ NC3 ⊕ CiSig1) to hide pass-
words and not explicitly send it in the PWi change request. It encrypts the PWi change
request (Enci(TSCi‖NC1‖NC2‖NC3‖ UPCSCi ‖ MPCSCi ‖ tmp oldPWi‖ tmp newPWi ‖CiSig1))
and sends it to CS, Ci then hides its private key by CiKpri ⊕GM ⊕ newPWi ⊕NCi .
• CS side: CS receives and decrypts a password update request (Enci). It examines timestamp
to prevent delayed requests, and examines UPCSCi and MP
CS
Ci
in datasets. CS extracts old PWi
and new PWi from tmp oldPWi ⊕ NC2 ⊕ CiSig1 and tmp newPWi ⊕NC3 ⊕ CiSig1. Then,
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Password update protocol:
Inputs UIDi, MIDi, oldPWi,
and newPWi
Replaces UIDi with UP
CS
Ci
and
MIDi with MP
CS
Ci
Calls GM
CiKpri = tmpCiKpri ⊕GM⊕
oldPWi ⊕NCi
Generates NC1 , NC2 , and NC3
Computes TSCi
CiSig1 = h(TSCi ||NC1 ||UPCSCi ||
MPCSCi
||oldPWi)
Computes tmp oldPWi =
oldPWi ⊕NC2 ⊕ CiSig1
Computes tmp newPWi =
newPWi ⊕NC3 ⊕ CiSig1
Requesti = Enci(TSCi ||NC1 ||NC2
||NC3 ||UPCSCi ||MP
CS
Ci
||
tmp oldPWi||tmp newPWi
||CiSig1)
Generates NCi
tmpCiKpri = CiKpri ⊕GM⊕
newPWi ⊕NCi
Password update request
From Ci:
Deci(Requesti)
Checks TSCS − TCi ≤ 4T
Checks UPCSCi
and MPCSCi
in datasets
Computes oldPWi = tmp oldPWi ⊕NC2
⊕CiSig1
Computes newPWi = tmp newPWi ⊕NC3
⊕CiSig1
CSSig1 = h(TSCi ||NC1 ||UPCSCi ||MP
CS
Ci
||
oldPWi)
Checks CSSig1 = CiSig1
To AS:
Computes TSCS =new TSCS
Replaces UPCSCi
and MPCSCi
with
UPASCS and MP
AS
CS
Generates NCS1 , NCS2 , and NCS3
CSSig2 = h(TSCS ||NCS1 ||UPASCS ||MPASCS ||
oldPWi)
Computes tmp oldPWi = oldPWi ⊕NCS2
⊕CSSig2
Computes tmp newPWi = newPWi⊕
NCS3 ⊕ CSSig2
Requesti = Enci(TSCS ||NCS1 ||NCS2 ||NCS3
||UPASCS ||MPASCS ||tmp oldPWi||
tmp newPWi||CSSig2)
Check security parameters
From CS:
Deci(Requesti)
Checks TSAS − TCS ≤ 4T
Checks UPASCS and MP
AS
CS in datasets
and linked with real IDs
Computes oldPWi = tmp oldPWi ⊕NCS1
⊕CSSig2
Checks oldPWi in dataset
ASSig1 = h(TSCS ||NCS1 ||UPASCS ||MPASCS
||oldPWi)
Checks ASSig1 = CSSig2
Computes newPWi = tmp newPWi⊕
NCS2 ⊕ CSSig2
Changes oldPWi to newPWi
Figure 6: Password update protocol
it computes signature value (CSSig1) depending on TSCi , NC1 , UP
CS
Ci
, MPCSCi , and oldPWi
to check the matching between CSSig1 and CiSig1. Similarly, in authentication protocol, CS
computes TSCS and replaces pseudonyms. CS generates three nonces NCS1 , NCS2 , and NCS3
and then CS computes signature value (h(TSCi‖NC1‖UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖oldPWi) and hides old
PWi and new PWi by oldPWi⊕NCS2 ⊕CSSig2 and newPWi⊕NCS3 ⊕CSSig2. It encrypts
password update request with security parameters (TSCS , NCS1 , NCS2 , NCS3 , UP
AS
CS , MP
AS
CS ,
tmp oldPWi, tmp newPWi, and CSSig2) and sends to AS.
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• AS side: AS receives password update request, and decrypts (Enci) this request with ASKpri ,
and CSKpui . It checks time delay and then, it checks link pseudonyms with real information
for users. It extracts old PWi from tmp oldPWi ⊕ NCS2 ⊕ CSSig2 and then, it checks old
PWi in dataset. It computes the signature value ASSig1 = h(TSCS‖NCS1‖UPASCS ‖MPASCS ‖
oldPWi), and then, it compares the calculated result (ASSig1) with the result of the received
signature (CSSig2). If identical, the signature is true; otherwise, AS rejects the PWi change
request. AS performs the calculation tmp newPWi⊕NCS3⊕CSSig2 to obtain the new PWi
value. If all previous checks are validated, AS changes old PWi to new PWi.
4.3.5 Revocation Protocol
Revocation in HC applications uses when a user finishes a task or to prevent attack. This protocol
can be completed by Ci, or AS. If Ci wants to cancel his account from the HC system after complet-
ing his/her duties such as a research doctor who uses the system for a limited period and then cancel
his account after the completion of his duties. Additionally, AS can revoke the account of any user
who performs suspicious activities (internal attacks) that are not within his/her privileges such as a
nurse who wants to access the personal information of a particular doctor, or patient. Furthermore,
the user can request from authorities provider (AS) to revoke his/her account information that is
associated with his/her data (note that the patients’ data history remains stored in DS even after
the completion of the revocation protocol). The protocol of revocation is extremely important in
restricting the malicious activities of HC systems. RAMHU includes a revocation protocol to provide
strict security procedures in protecting users’ authentication information (Figure 7 shows revocation
protocol in Ci side in RAMHU):
Revocation from Ci side:
• Ci enters UIDi, MIDi, and PWi and then replaces UIDi with UPCSCi and MIDi with
MPCSCi . It chooses the revocation reason (RRi) from the drop-down list (such as ending
the researcher’s study, ending a satisfactory condition, resigning a professional, changing a
health institution, and the unwillingness of a patient to use the system). These reasons
have converted to signatures using PHOTON to get MDs with a 256-bits in the dataset.
Ci computes new TSCi , NC1 , NC2 , and NC3 . Then, Ci performs the process of RRi ⊕ NC1
to add randomness for RRi. Using this procedure is very useful in tightening security and
distinguishing the roles of users (patients or professionals) in CS. It computes the signa-
ture CiSig1 = h(TSCi‖NC1‖UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖ RRi‖ PWi‖ ”delete”). Ci performs a computa-
tion to hide the RRi (tmpRRi = RRi ⊕ NC2 ⊕ CiSig1). Ci computes the temporary PWi
value of PWi ⊕ NC3 ⊕ CiSig1 to hide the PWi value. Additionally, It computes encryption
(Enci(TSCi‖NC1‖NC2‖NC3‖UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖ tmpRRi‖ tmpPWi ‖CiSig1)) and sends a revo-
cation request to CS. Then, It hides a private key, in the same way, in the password update
protocol.
• CS decrypts (Enci) and computes timestamp and examines UPCSCi and MPCSCi in the datasets.
It obtains the RRi from the computation equation RRi = tmpRRi⊕NC2⊕CSSig1. It extracts
PWi from tmpPWi⊕NC3⊕CiSig1 and checks PWi matching in the dataset. CS computes the
signature (CSSig1 = h(TSCi‖NC1‖UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖RRi ‖PWi‖ ”delete”) and then compares
the result of the signatures. CS computes operation RRi⊕NC1 to use RRi’s signature in order
to compare the RRi with the user’s Ri. If all operations are achieved and validated correctly,
CS sends a request to AS to check the pseudonym’s association with real information and
check PWi. AS deletes association between pseudonyms and information, and delete user’s
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Revocation protocol:
Inputs UIDi, MIDi, PWi,
and RRi
Replaces UIDi with UP
CS
Ci
and
MIDi with MP
CS
Ci
and
RRi with signature
Calls GM
CiKpri = tmpCiKpri ⊕GM⊕
PWi ⊕NCi
Generates NC1 , NC2 , and NC3
Computes TSCi
Computes RRi = RRi ⊕NC1
CiSig1 = h(TSCi ||NC1 ||UPCSCi ||
MPCSCi
||RRi||PWi||
”delete”)
Computes tmp RRi =
RRi ⊕NC2 ⊕ CiSig1
Computes tmp PWi =
PWi ⊕NC3 ⊕ CiSig1
Requesti = Enci(TSCi ||NC1 ||NC2
||NC3 ||UPCSCi ||MP
CS
Ci
||
tmp RRi||tmp PWi||CiSig1)
Generates NCi
tmpCiKpri = CiKpri ⊕GM⊕
PWi ⊕NCi
Revocation request
From Ci:
Deci(Requesti)
Checks TSCS − TCi ≤ 4T
Checks UPCSCi
and MPCSCi
in datasets
Computes RRi = tmp RRi ⊕NC2 ⊕ CiSig1
Computes PWi = tmp PWi ⊕NC3 ⊕ CiSig1
CSSig1 = h(TSCi ||NCi ||UPCSCi ||MP
CS
Ci
||
RRi||PWi||”delete”)
Checks CSSig1 = CiSig1
Computes RRi = RRi ⊕NC1
Checks RRi in dataset and matches with Ri
To AS:
Computes TSCS =new TSCS
Replaces UPCSCi
and MPCSCi
with
UPASCS and MP
AS
CS
Generates NCS1 , and NCS2
CSSig2 = h(TSCS ||NCS1 ||UPASCS ||MPASCS ||
PWi||”delete PWi UP MP”)
Computes tmp PWi = PWi ⊕NCS2
⊕CSiSig2
Requesti = Enci(TSCS ||NCS1 ||NCS2 ||UPASCS
||MPASCS ||tmp PWi||CSSig2)
Pseudonyms and PWi delete
From CS:
Deci(Requesti)
Checks TSAS − TCS ≤ 4T
Checks UPASCS and MP
AS
CS in datasets
and linked with real IDs
Computes PWi = tmp PWi ⊕NCS2
⊕CSSig2
Checks PWi in dataset
ASSig1 = h(TSCS ||NCS1 ||UPASCS ||MPASCS
||PWi||”delete PWi UP MP”)
Checks ASSig1 = CSSig2
Deletes PWi from dataset
To CS:
Computes TSAS and NAS
Replaces UPASCS and MP
AS
CS with
UPCSAS and MP
CS
AS
ASSig2 = h(TSAS ||UPCSAS ||MPCSAS ||NAS
||”delete MAC”)
Requesti = Enci(TSAS ||UPCSAS ||MPCSAS ||
ASSig2||NAS)
Separates association of UP , and MP
MAC address delete request
From AS:
Deci(Requesti)
Checks TSCS − TAS ≤ 4T
Checks UPCSAS and MP
CS
AS in datasets
CSSig3 = h(TSAS ||UPCSAS ||MPCSAS ||NAS
||”delete MAC”)
Checks CSSig3 = ASSig2
Deletes MAC from dataset
Figure 7: Revocation protocol
PWi from dataset. AS sends MAC delete request to CS. Upon receiving MAC delete request,
CS decrypts this request, then checks security parameters and signature. If all operations are
achieved and validated correctly, CS deletes MAC address from dataset. At this point, this
user cannot perform an authentication process in RAMHU.
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Revocation from AS side:
• AS deletes the association between user’s information and pseudonyms and PWi in datasets.
It sends an encrypted request (Enci) to CS to delete device’s MAC address for this user. After
the completion of this protocol, the user is considered illegal and cannot access HC services.
5 Security Analysis
In this section, a theoretical, and an experimental security analysis have been presented. We describe
how RAMHU applies security requirements in protecting users’ authentication information in the
HC system.
5.1 Theoretical Security Analysis
The theoretical security analysis shows that RAMHU is secure against the various known attacks.
In this section, we will show how RAMHU provides a high-security level against these attacks by
providing assumptions and proofs. Table 4 summarises the comparison between RAMHU and other
authentication protocols in various attacks resistance.
• RAMHU prevents a privileged insider attack.
Proof 1: The internal intruder (II) needs to eavesdrop authentication requests between Ci
and CS. After that, he/she tries to perform an analysis of these requests based on his/her
access privileges to the network. First, the analysis of these requests to obtain the private key
or password is infeasible because the authentication request is encrypted by the ECIES-256
bits algorithm; II cannot decrypt these requests with his private key. Second, if II broke
the encryption (which is impossible), he/she is unable to extract the PWi value (tmpPWi =
PWi ⊕ NCi ⊕ GM ⊕ CiSig1) in the login protocol because it is hidden and depends on the
values of GM , CiSig1, and NCi where II does not know the GM value of the legitimate
user’s device, and the CiSig1 value depends on the CM value that is also not known to II.
Therefore, RAMHU prevents a privileged insider attack.
• RAMHU is resistant to stolen attack.
Proof 2: In the first case, The intruder (I) steals a legitimate user device (such as a laptop)
that contains a client application. In our scheme, user’s PWi, and IDs are not stored on the
user’s device, or in the client application. In addition, the private key is hidden and random
for each authentication process by CiKpri ⊕ GM ⊕ PWi ⊕ NCi . Additionally, the Proof 1
shows that the PWi value cannot be extracted from the tmpPWi. If I is II, he/she also
cannot use his/her IDs and PWi to access information or other user data because both CS
and AS perform matching IDs, and PWi to determine user-related information and data. In
the second case, the attacker steals only client application. I cannot use the application on
another device because it does not have OTPi or original MAC, which prevents the application
from being used on another device even if I knows the IDs and PWi. The original MAC
mechanism (CiSig1 = h(CM‖NCi‖TSCi) prevents the fake authentication request from being
verified in the server because I cannot generate an original MAC address (CM) in CiSig1.
Thus, RAMHU is resistant to stolen attack.
• RAMHU resists replay attack.
Proof 3: I tries to get a login/registration/authentication request for a legitimate user to send
it later and thus, gains access to the network. This case is infeasible in our scheme because
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all entities (Ci, CS, and AS) use timestamp (such as TSCS − TSCi ≤ 4T , where 4T is
the maximum transfer delay rate) that prevents the attacker from sending the authentication
request at a later time. Furthermore, signatures and random nonces are not usable the next
times. Hence, RAMHU successfully resists replay attack.
• RAMHU overcomes the MITM attack.
Proof 4: Assume that an I attempts to intercept encrypted login/authentication requests
(such as Enci(TSCi‖NCi‖ CiSig1‖UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖tmpPWi‖CiSig2)) among network entities,
and then modifies or replaces these requests with his/her messages to send to network entities.
However, the attacker cannot replace exchanged requests among Ci, CS, and AS because, first,
he/she does not know the private keys (CiKpri , CSKpri , ASKpri) and therefore, the decryption
process is computationally infeasible with 256 bits key length and difficulty in solving ECDLP.
Second, mutual authentication with PHOTON-256 signatures prevents the modification of
requests between RAMHU’s entities. As a result, RAMHU gracefully overcomes the MITM
attack.
• RAMHU is safe against guessing attack.
Proof 5: Assume that an external intruder (EI) was able to penetrate the encryption (Enci)
between Ci and CS (from Proof 4, this assumption is infeasible). This EI tries to guess PWi
in a login request to use it to access the network as a legitimate user. EI cannot detect PWi for
any authorised user (either on-line or off-line) because he/she does not know the configured
process to protect PWi (tmpPWi = PWi ⊕ NCi ⊕ GM ⊕ CiSig1) and does not know the
MAC address for that user and thus, the process of deriving PWi is infeasible (Proof 1). It is
an extremely difficult process to guess PWi from the tmpPWi, which is 64 hex (256 bit). In
addition, EI cannot detect UIDi and MIDi for any legitimate user because of the use of multi
pseudonyms mechanism for users and medical centres instead of sending real information to
legitimate users. As a result, RAMHU is safe against guessing attack.
• RAMHU withstands against client impersonation attack.
Proof 6: Assume that an attacker tries to impersonate a login request (such as Enci =
TSCi‖NCi ‖CiSig1‖ UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖tmpPWi‖CiSig2) for a legitimate user. This I can create
TSCi and NCi but does not know PWi and CiKpri (Proofs 1, and 4) for the legitimate user,
namely, I cannot impersonate the user identity. I also tries to impersonate the legitimate user’s
device by programmatically changing the MAC address to a legitimate one to gain access to
the network. This case is infeasible because the original MAC check (CM) in CiSig1 =
h(CM‖NCi‖TSCi) detects the attacker’s attempt to mimic the legitimate user’s device (as
in Proof 2). Therefore, RAMHU withstands against instances of impersonating the user’s
identity and device.
• RAMHU resists server impersonation attack.
Proof 7: Assume that an I traps login requests from Ci to CS. The attacker tries to deceive
Ci by sending fake requests to Ci in order to inform them that he is a legitimate server. I needs
the private key for CS to decrypt and to accomplish the attack. Mutual authentication prevents
I from impersonating CS’s requests (such as Enci(TSCS‖NCS‖UPCiCS‖MPCiCS‖CSSig5)) and
sending them to Ci. This mechanism ensures that Ci deals with legitimate CS. Consequently,
our protocol effectively resists server impersonation attack.
• RAMHU resists DoS attack.
Proof 8: In order for I to execute a DoS attack against CS and AS, he/she needs to decrypt
the login request and change its data or send the same request multiple times for destroying
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servers. However, in the first case, decryption and change of signatures are infeasible as
in Proofs 2 and 4. CS checks signature validity and rejects login requests containing fake
signatures, and I cannot execute a collision or preimage attack because PHOTON-256 supplies
PR, SPR, and CR. In the second case, the attacker sends the same request multiple times.
This status is infeasible because CS or AS checks timestamp (TSCi , TSCS , TSAS) for each
login/authentication request and eliminates all late requests (Proof 3) without checking the
other security parameters such as PWi, CM , and multi pseudonyms. In case I can break the
encryption, he/she can change timestamp and nonce but cannot tamper with the signatures.
RAMHU prevents this condition during CiSig1 and does not need to check the remaining
security parameters. Therefore, RAMHU successfully resists DoS attack.
• RAMHU is secure against password change attack.
Proof 9: Assume that an I intercepts a request to change PWi between Ci and CS. When I
obtains an encrypted password update request (such as Enci(TSCi‖NC1‖NC2‖NC3‖UPCSCi ‖
MPCSCi ‖ tmp oldPWi‖ tmp newPWi‖ CiSig1)). If I can decrypt (this process is infeasible as
in Proofs 1, and 4), he/she will find a temporary passwords and cannot derive new PWi because
it depends on the CiSig1 = h(TSCi‖NC1‖UPCSCi ‖ MPCSCi ‖oldPWi). The signature operation
(CiSig1) is based on the old PWi which is not explicitly sent to CS in this protocol. I does not
know old PWi and therefore, he/she cannot create a signature to complete the PWi change
process. Thereupon, RAMHU provides a reliable solution against password change attack.
• RAMHU is resistant to eavesdropping attack.
Proof 10: Assume that an I eavesdrops login/authentication requests to gain information
about user authentication and access to the network. However, in our scheme, I will not benefit
from requests that are intercepted because RAMHU uses ECIES algorithm with key 256 bits to
encrypt authentication information. The attacker can only decrypt requests by deriving private
keys and this operation is infeasible (as in Proofs 1, and 2) due to key length, and random
encryption with nonces (anonymity). Therefore, our protocol is resistant to eavesdropping
attack.
• RAMHU resists traceability attack.
Proof 11: I attempts to collect as many login/authentication requests as possible and then
performs an analysis of those requests that helps him/her to perform user identity tracing.
When an I succeeds in tracking user requests, he/she can detect and distinguish patients’
data. All exchanged requests among RAMHU’s entities do not contain direct users’ infor-
mation (such as username). RAMHU replaces the real user IDs (UIDi and MIDi) with
pseudonyms. Our protocol uses multi pseudonyms (UPCSCi , UP
AS
CS , UP
CS
AS , and UP
Ci
CS for
users and MPCSCi , MP
AS
CS , MP
CS
AS , and MP
Ci
CS for medical centres) to prevent attackers from
tracking user requests and revealing their identities when transferred between RAMHU entities
(Ci, CS, and AS). Hence, RAMHU resists traceability attack.
• RAMHU prevents revocation attack.
Proof 12: Assume that an I tries to penetrate a revocation request. The attacker tries to
analyse the request and use it to prevent users from accessing the network’s services. Depending
on Proofs 1, 5, and 11, the attacker cannot extract or distinguish UIDi, MIDi and PWi from
the revocation request. The attacker does not know and cannot extract a reason from the
tmpRRi, which is based on the values of RRi, NC2 , and CiSig1. In Proofs 2 and 8, I cannot
perform collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks against the PHOTON-256 algorithm.
Thus, our protocol prevents penetration of revocation request.
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Table 4: Comparison of resistance in repelling the threats between RAMHU and existing schemes
Attack He et
al. [1]
Giri et
al. [17]
Li et
al. [6]
Farash
et al.
[26]
Kumar
et al.
[27]
Jiang
et al.
[28]
Rajput
et al.
[7]
Das et
al. [5]
Chandrakar
et al. [19]
RAMHU
scheme
Privileged-insider X X X X X X
Stolen device/application X X X X X
Replay X X X X X X X X X
MITM X X X X X
Guessing X X X X X X
Client impersonation X X X X X X X X X X
Server impersonation X X X X X X X X X
DoS X X X X
Change password X X X X X X
Eavesdropping X X X X X X X X X X
Traceability X X X X X X X X
Revocation X X X
Verifier X X X X X
Leakage X X X X X X X
• RAMHU resists verifier attack.
Proof 13: Assume that I tries to penetrate the datasets in CS. If the attacker is EI, he/she
cannot penetrate datasets because he/she does not have a Kpr, UID, MID, OTP , and PWi.
If the attacker is II, when he penetrates datasets in CS and wants to impersonate another
user’s identity, first, he/she cannot distinguish this information for a particular user because
the real information for users is stored in AS. Second, since CS does not contain passwords’
dataset, II will not benefit from hacking datasets such as pseudonyms and cannot create a
request and send it to AS because it does not know users’ passwords. Therefore, RAMHU
resists verifier attack meritoriously.
• RAMHU resists leakage attack.
Proof 14: Suppose that I listens to some exchanged requests among Ci, CS, and AS and
tries to find any information that helps him/her to penetrate network authentication such
as sending an ID explicitly, or sending a password with weak encryption. Exchanged re-
quests between RAMHU entities such as a password update request (Enci(TSCi‖NC1‖NC2
‖NC3 ‖UPCSCi ‖MPCSCi ‖ tmp oldPWi‖ tmp newPWi‖CiSig1)) show that I does not receive
any leaked real information for users during transmission, such as IDs and PWi (all informa-
tion is anonymous and hidden) that could be useful in penetrating the HC network. Therefore,
RAMHU resists leakage attack.
5.2 Experimental Security Analysis
To ensure that authentication schemes work correctly and are authenticated, these schemes require
a formal tool to detect the robustness of users’ authentication in the network. We provide the
proposed scheme simulation using the AVISPA tool to verify our scheme, whether safe or unsafe.
Our simulations are based on the AVISPA tool with the current version v.1.1 (13/02/2006) available
on the website in [58]. This tool has been widely used and accepted by researchers in recent years
[59, 60]. It has been used to check security problems and ensure that known attacks are not able to
penetrate users’ authentication information.
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Table 5: Some HLSPL’s symbols and statements
Symbol Description
. Concatenation
{} Kp Asymmetric encryption with public key
played by Used to link the role with the intended entity
= | > Reaction transitions to relate event with act
/\ Conjunction
protocol id Goal identifier
secrecy of The goal of protecting the secret between entities permanently
authentication on The goal of strong authentication between entities
intruder knowledge What intruder knows about network
5.2.1 AVISPA Description
After designing any authentication protocol, this protocol should be checked and its accuracy verified
under a test model such as the Dolev-Yao (dy) to analyse, trace and detect the possibility of attack
theoretically. However, this analysis needs to be simulated in a practical manner to detect errors
and hidden traces of the authentication protocol designer, statistics and accurate results, check-
ing several techniques on the same protocol. The AVISPA tool provides the features listed above as
well as the ease, robustness, and applicability of this tool to implement authentication protocols [61].
The AVISPA tool is a push-button, testing/proofing model and is based on HLPSL language.
This language uses directives and expressive terms to represent security procedures. It is integrated
with four backends that are the On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC), the Constraint-Logic-based
Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), the SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC), and (Tree Automata based
on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP) to perform the simu-
lation in AVISPA. Each backend gives the result of simulation analysis statistics that is different from
the other [58]. SATMC and TA4SP backends do not work with a security protocol that implements
the XoR gateway; therefore, we relied on OFMC and CL-AtSe backends to simulate RAMHU. To
implement the authentication protocol in AVISPA, this protocol should be first written in HLPSL
and then converts to the low-level language. The latter is read directly by the backends, which is an
intermediate format (IF) by the hlpsl2if compiler. Then, it converts to an output format (OF) to ex-
tract and describe the result of analysis by one of four backends. The result of the analysis accurately
describes that the protocol is safe or not safe with some statistical numbers. HLPSL is modular, and
role-oriented. This language allows the completion of authentication protocol procedures as well as
intruder actions. To represent authentication scenarios and build simulation structures, HLPSL uses
roles, including basic roles such as clients and servers (clients, centralServer, and attributesServer),
and composition (session and environment) roles that control the sequence of sending and receiving
actions between clients and servers. In addition, communication channels between network entities
are governed by the dy model. Many basic types used in HLPSL to represent variables, constants,
and algorithms (symmetric/asymmetric/hash) such as agent, public key, message, text, nat, const,
and hash func; in addition to some symbols and terms that have shown in Table 5, more details are
provided in [58]. The authentication protocol in AVISPA depends on security features in the goal
specification. Each protocol contains a set of goals (authentication and secret) in authenticating each
party with the other. The goals in secrecy of demonstrate that secrets are not exposed or hacked to
non-intended entities. While the goals in authentication on demonstrate that strong authentication
has been applied between entities based on witness and request.
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5.2.2 Proposed Scheme with AVISPA
In this section, we will illustrate the simulation of RAMHU in the AVISPA tool using HLPSL lan-
guage. Our scheme depends on three core roles: clienti, centralServer, and attributesServer played
by Ci, CS and AS respectively. In addition, it includes the supporting roles such as session, and en-
vironment, goal specification section. Each role contains parameters, variables, and local constants.
Each basic role contains a transition section that indicates the sequence of communication among
entities. Each supporting role contains a composition section that indicates the binding of roles
and sessions. Asymmetric encryption has been implemented between scheme entities (Ci, CS, and
AS) during public key exchange (KCpu, KCSpu, and KASpu) to perform confidentiality. Moreover,
mutual authentication has used to ensure the legitimacy of related parties in the protocols of the
proposed scheme (initial setup, registration, login, and authentication). Moreover, it uses nonces
(Nc, Ncs, and Nas) and timestamp (TSc, TScs, TSas) to support the features of anonymity and
freshness. Our scheme accomplishes 10 secrecy goals and 6 authentication goals as noted in the goal
section in Figure 11.
The authentication process begins by sending requests from clients to the server. Therefore,
the clienti role includes the start signal as shown in Figure 8. Ci receives the start signal and
changes the state flag (State variable) from 0 to 1. It replaces UID and MID with UPc and
MPc and calculates the timestamp (TS
′
c) and new nonce (N
′
c) by the new() operation. After that, it
computes the signatures (CiSig1 and CiSig2), as well as the password hiding process as calculated in
the computation operation of the TmpPW parameter. It encrypts the registration and login request
(TS′c, N
′
c, GM
′, CiSig′1, UP
′
c, MP
′
c, OTPi, Tmp PW
′, and CiSig′2) by the public key (KCSpu) to
establish a reliable communication with CS. Ci sends the request to CS where the transmission
process is performed by the SND() operation. It achieves a set of secret goals (sec1 to sec6) with
both CS and AS; these secrets have been only known and kept by the intended parties. For instance
in sec1, UID, MID, and PW have been known and kept only to Ci, and AS. While in sec3 GM ,
and CM have been known and kept only to Ci and CS, since these parameters are not transmitted
directly during the transition of information between network parties such as PW implicitly is in the
computation of TmpPW and CM is implicitly in CiSig1. Ci also achieves the goal of authentication
using statement (witness) with parameters (Ci, CS, ci cs auth2, Ncs, TSc). Namely, Ci is a witness
that the security parameters (Ncs, TSc) are fresh and correct. CS uses a statement (request) to
validate parameters with the strong authentication goal (ci cs auth2) specified in the goal section
(Figure 12). Ci receives the authentication response by the RCV () operation and sent from AS by
CS. Then, Ci decrypts the response using its private key to verify the security parameters. If all
security parameters are verified correctly, Ci performs the mutual authentication process securely.
As shown in Figure 9, CS receives a registration and login request by RCV () operation in state
0. It decrypts request with its private key and then checks the parameters and signatures to ac-
complish secret and authentication goals. CS changes the state signal from 0 to 1 and constructs
an authentication request based on the security parameters (TS′cs, N
′
cs, UPcs, MPcs, CSSig3, and
TmpPW ) and encrypts it by the public key of AS. CS performs strong authentication with AS dur-
ing witness (CS, AS, as cs auth4, TS′cs, N
′
cs) to accomplish the authentication goal (as cs auth4)
based on timestamp and fresh nonce and validated in AS by statement (request). In state 1, CS
receives an authentication response from AS and checks the security parameters after decryption
with its private key. It changes the state signal to 2 and then constructs the authentication response
to Ci. CS sends response with two strong authentication goals (cs ci auth1 and cs ci auth5) based
on the security parameters (Nc, TScs, TmpPW , and OTPi).
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role clienti(Ci,CS,AS:agent, KCpu,KCSpu:public_key,
H:hash_func,
UID,MID,OTPi,PW,GM,CM:message,
SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by Ci def=
local
State:nat,
TSc,TScs,Nc,Ncs:text,
CiSig1,CiSig2:text,
UPc,MPc,UPcs,MPcs,TmpPW:message
const
sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,
cs_ci_auth1,ci_cs_auth2:protocol_id
init
State := 0
transition
1. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
State’:= 1
/\ UPc’:=UID/\MPc’:=MID/\GM’:=Ci
/\ Nc’:=new()/\ TSc’:=new()
/\ CiSig1’:= H(CM.Nc’.TSc’)
/\ CiSig2’:= H(GM’.Nc’.TSc’.CiSig1’.UPc’.MPc’.
OTPi.PW)
/\ TmpPW’:=xor(PW,xor(Nc’,xor(GM’,CiSig1’)))
% registeration and login protocol
% Ci sends security parameters to CS
/\ SND({TSc’.Nc’.GM’.CiSig1’.UPc’.MPc’.OTPi.
TmpPW’.CiSig2’}_KCSpu)
/\ secret({UID,MID,PW},sec1,{Ci,AS})
/\ secret(PW,sec2,{Ci,CS})
/\ secret({GM,CM},sec3,{Ci,CS})
/\ secret({CiSig1’,CiSig2’},sec4,{Ci,CS})
/\ secret({TmpPW’,OTPi},sec5,{Ci,CS})
/\ secret({UPc,MPc,UPcs,MPcs},sec6,{Ci,CS})
2. State = 1
% Ci receives authentication response from CS
/\ RCV({TScs’.Ncs’.Nc.UPcs’.MPcs’.
H(TScs’.Ncs’.UPcs’.MPcs’)}_KCpu)=|>
State’:= 2 /\ SND({Ncs’}_KCSpu)
% Clienti checks that the received security parameters
/\ request(Ci,CS,cs_ci_auth1,{Nc,TScs})
/\ request(Ci,CS,cs_ci_auth5,{TmpPW,OTPi})
% Clienti sends Ncs to prove her identity
/\ witness(Ci,CS,ci_cs_auth2,{Ncs,TSc})
end role
Figure 8: Client role in HLPSL
role centralServer(Ci,CS,AS:agent,
KCpu,KCSpu,KASpu:public_key,
H:hash_func,
SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by CS def=
local
State:nat,
UPc,MPc,UPcs,MPcs,UPas,MPas,TmpPW:message,
CSSig1,CSSig2,CSSig3:text,
TSc,TScs,TSas,Nc,Ncs,Nas:text,
PW,OTPi:message,
GM,CM:message
const
sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,sec6,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10,
ci_cs_auth2,cs_ci_auth1,cs_ci_auth5,cs_as_auth3,
as_cs_auth4,as_cs_auth6:protocol_id
init
State := 0
transition
% Registration and login request from Ci
1. State = 0 /\ RCV({TSc’.Nc’.GM’.H(CM’.Nc’.TSc’).
UPc’.MPc’.OTPi’.TmpPW’.
H(GM’.Nc’.TSc’.H(CM’.Nc’.TSc’).
UPc’.MPc’.OTPi’.PW’)}_KCSpu) =|>
CSSig1’:= H(CM’.Nc’.TSc’)
/\ CSSig2’:= H(GM’.Nc’.TSc’.CSSig1’.UPc’.MPc’.OTPi.PW)
/\ PW’:=xor(TmpPW,xor(Nc’,xor(GM’,CSSig1)))
/\ secret(PW’,sec2,{CS,Ci})
/\ secret({GM,CM},sec3,{CS,Ci})
/\ secret({CSSig1,CSSig2},sec4,{CS,Ci})
/\ secret({TmpPW’,OTPi},sec5,{CS,Ci})
/\ secret({UPc,MPc,UPcs,MPcs},sec6,{CS,Ci})
% Authentication request from CS to AS
/\ State’:= 1 /\Ncs’:=new() /\TScs’:=new()
/\ CSSig3’:= H(TScs’.Ncs’.UPcs.MPcs)
/\ TmpPW’:=xor(PW,xor(Ncs’,CSSig3’))
/\ SND({TScs’.Ncs’.UPcs.MPcs.CSSig3’.TmpPW’}_KASpu)
/\ secret(PW,sec7,{CS,AS})
/\ secret({CSSig3},sec8,{CS,AS})
/\ secret({TmpPW’},sec9,{CS,AS})
/\ secret({UPcs,MPcs,UPas,MPas},sec10,{CS,AS})
% Authentication response from AS to CS
2. State = 1 /\ RCV({TSas’.Nas’.Ncs.UPas’.MPas’.
H(TSas’.Nas’.UPas’.MPas’)}_KCSpu)=|>
% Authentication response to Ci
State’:= 2/\ Ncs’:=new() /\TScs’:=new()
/\ SND({TScs’.Ncs’.Nc.UPcs.MPcs.
H(TScs’.Ncs’.UPcs.MPcs)}_KCpu)
% CS prove his identity
/\ witness(CS,Ci,cs_ci_auth1,{Nc,TScs’})
/\ witness(CS,Ci,cs_ci_auth5,{TmpPW,OTPi})
/\ witness(CS,AS,cs_as_auth3,{Nas’,TScs’})
/\ request(CS,AS,as_cs_auth4,{Ncs’,TSas})
/\ request(CS,AS,as_cs_auth6,{PW})
3. State = 2 /\ RCV({Ncs}_KCSpu) =|>
% CS checks that the received nonce and timestamp correct
State’:= 3 /\ request(CS,Ci,ci_cs_auth2,{Ncs,TSc})
end role
Figure 9: Central server role in HLPSL
AS receives the authentication request and decrypts it with the private key as shown in Fig-
ure 10. It accomplishes 5 secret goals, and accomplishes two authentication goals (as cs auth4 and
as cs auth6) based on TS′cs, N
′
cs, and PW
′. It constructs the authentication response and estab-
lishes strong authentication when validating parameters (TSas, N
′
cs, and PW
′) in CS. Figure 11
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role attributesServer(AS,Ci,CS:agent,
KASpu,KCSpu:public_key,
H:hash_func,SND,RCV:channel(dy))
played_by AS def=
local
State:nat,
UID,MID,PW:message,
TmpPW:message,
ASSig1,ASSig2:text,
TScs,Ncs,TSas,Nas:text,
UPcs,MPcs,UPas,MPas:message,
GM,CM:message
const
sec1,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10,
cs_as_auth3,as_cs_auth4,as_cs_auth6:protocol_id
init
State:= 0
transition
1. State = 0 /\ RCV({TScs’.Ncs’.UPcs’.MPcs’.
H(TScs’.Ncs’.UPcs’.MPcs’).
TmpPW’}_KCSpu)=|>
ASSig1’:= H(TScs’.Ncs’.UPcs.MPcs)
/\ PW’:=xor(TmpPW,xor(Ncs’,ASSig1))
/\ secret({UID,MID,PW},sec1,{AS,Ci})
/\ secret(PW,sec7,{AS,CS})
/\ secret({ASSig1},sec8,{AS,CS})
/\ secret({TmpPW’},sec9,{AS,CS})
/\ secret({UPcs,MPcs,UPas,MPas},sec10,{AS,CS})
/\ State’:= 1
/\ Nas’:=new()
/\ TSas’:=new()
/\ ASSig2’:=H(TSas’.Nas’.UPas.MPas)
/\ SND({TSas’.Nas’.Ncs.UPas.MPas.ASSig2’}_KCSpu)
/\ witness(AS,CS,as_cs_auth4,{Ncs’,TSas’})
/\ witness(AS,CS,as_cs_auth6,{PW’})
/\request(AS,CS,cs_as_auth3,{Nas’,TScs’})
end role
Figure 10: Attribute server role in HLPSL
role session(Ci,CS,AS:agent,
KCpu,KCSpu,KASpu:public_key,
H:hash_func,
UID,MID,OTPi,PW,GM,CM:message)
def=
local
SndC,RcvC,SndCS,RcvCS,SndAS,RcvAS:channel(dy)
composition
clienti(Ci,CS,AS,KCpu,KCSpu,H,UID,
MID,OTPi,PW,GM,CM,SndC,RcvC)
/\ centralServer(Ci,CS,AS,KCpu,KCSpu,
KASpu,H,SndCS,RcvCS)
/\ attributesServer(AS,Ci,CS,KASpu,KCSpu,
H,SndAS,RcvAS)
end role
%%%
role environment()
def=
const
ci,cs,as,i_ci,i_cs,i_as:agent,
kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,ki:public_key,
uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm:message,
h:hash_func,
sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,
sec6,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10,
ci_cs_auth2,cs_ci_auth1,cs_ci_auth5,cs_as_auth3,
as_cs_auth4,as_cs_auth6:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge={ci,cs,as,i_ci,i_cs,i_as,
kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,ki}
composition
session(ci,cs,as,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,h
,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
% Check replay attack
/\ session(ci,cs,as,kCpu,kCSpu,kASpu,h
,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
% Check MITM attack
/\ session(cs,ci,as,kCSpu,kCpu,kASpu,h
,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
% Check impersonate Ci
/\ session(i,cs,as,ki,kCSpu,kASpu,h
,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
% Chekc impersonate CS
/\ session(ci,i,as,kCpu,ki,kASpu,h
,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
% Check impersonate AS
/\ session(ci,cs,i,kCpu,kCSpu,ki,h
,uid,mid,otp,pw,gm,cm)
end role
%%%
goal
secrecy_of sec1,sec2,sec3,sec4,sec5,
sec6,sec7,sec8,sec9,sec10
authentication_on cs_ci_auth1,ci_cs_auth2
,cs_as_auth3,as_cs_auth4,
cs_ci_auth5,as_cs_auth6
end goal
Figure 11: Supporting roles in HLPSL
displays the roles of session, environment, and goal section. In the session role, a composition pro-
cess has been performed for the three roles (clienti, centralServer, and attributeServer). This
role specifies the transmit and receive channels in the dy model. In the environment role, the secu-
rity parameters, the goals specified in the goal section, and the known information for the intruder
(intruder knowledge) have been defined. In this role, one or more sessions are composed. We
tested our scheme with sessions for replay, MITM, and impersonating attacks. We assumed that
an intruder (I) creates a public key (ki) and has knowledge of the public keys (kCpu, kCSpu, and
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kASpu) of legitimate entities in the network. The intruder attempts to resend the registration/login
or authentication requests later, intercept/modify these requests, or impersonate the participating
entities using i ci, i cs, and i as constants rather than ci, cs, and as. The results section shows that
these attacks cannot penetrate the security goals in our scheme.
5.2.3 Simulation Results
In this section, the simulation results in the AVISPA tool are based on two backends (OFMC, and
CL-AtSe). Figure 12 shows the simulation result with the OFMC backend and Figure 13 displays the
simulation result with the CL-AtSe backend. From the results shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13, our
scheme clearly and accurately shows the SAFE result in the SUMMARY section, bounded number
of sessions in the DETAILS section, the goals of the scheme achieved (as specified) in the GOAL
section as well as statistical numbers such as time, number of nodes, and analysed states in the
STATISTICS section for both figures. Based on these results, we note that our scheme is capable
of preventing passive and active attacks such as replay, MITM, and impersonating. Thus, the goals
of the scheme in Figure 11 achieved to prevent the violation of legitimate user information in the
network authentication.
% OFMC
% Version of 2006/02/13
SUMMARY
SAFE
DETAILS
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
PROTOCOL
/home/span/span/testsuite/results/RAMHU.if
GOAL
as_specified
BACKEND
OFMC
COMMENTS
STATISTICS
parseTime: 0.00s
searchTime: 54.60s
visitedNodes: 3636 nodes
depth: 11 plies
Figure 12: Simulation result using OFMC
SUMMARY
SAFE
DETAILS
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
TYPED_MODEL
PROTOCOL
/home/span/span/testsuite/results/RAMHU.if
GOAL
As Specified
BACKEND
CL-AtSe
STATISTICS
Analysed : 324 states
Reachable : 64 states
Translation: 0.52 seconds
Computation: 0.42 seconds
Figure 13: Simulation result using CL-AtSe
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we found that existing healthcare applications were vulnerable to weak security against
some known attacks. Towards this end, we proposed a new robust authentication protocol (RAMHU)
to prevent internal, external, passive, and active attacks. Our scheme uses multi pseudonyms for
both users and medical centres to prevent the transmission of real information in the authentication
request and MAC address to prevent counterfeit devices from connecting to the network. The
lightweight encryption and signature algorithms (as described in Section 3) is used to ensure that
RAMHU’s efficient interaction with user requests is ensured. In addition, we provided a formal and
informal security analysis to demonstrate the effectiveness of RAMHU in repelling known attacks.
The RAMHU scheme provides a high-level security that maintains authentication information for
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users against various attacks. Future directions for further the development of this scheme are as
follows:
1. RAMHU requires strong authorization to support patient data exchange after user authenti-
cation. We need a mechanism that supports role-based and attribute-based privileges (e.g.,
doctor, nurse, patient, advisor, researcher, and emergency) to access patients’ data on a data
server (DS). We intend to use authorization policies with signatures to ensure proper autho-
rization of access to the data repository.
2. Our scheme uses lightweight and efficient performance algorithms that, according to many
researchers, have shown that ECIES and PHOTON are efficient encryption and signature
algorithms, respectively. We intend to evaluate RAMHU in terms of efficiency and discovery
of performance standards such as end-to-end request delay, throughput, and error rate.
3. We intend to use the wireless sensor network (WSN) to collect patients’ data and send it to
DS. However, collecting and storing data in DS requires the use of encryption and signature
algorithms against known attacks.
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